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1 Introduction
Although there has been much debate about the
means of citizen participation, it is generally accepted
that participatory democracy improves state
responsiveness and creates better policies. Citizen
participation allows voters to contribute to
government decision-making beyond elections and
can provide politically marginalised populations with
a say in policy (Houtzager et al. 2003). As a result,
citizen participation has gained the support of
governments and international development
agencies alike. The participatory budgeting practices
developed in Porto Alegre in Brazil in the late 1980s,
for example, have been replicated in cities
worldwide.
In India the first initiative towards institutionalising
citizen participation in governance was taken by the
Delhi government through the Bhagidari
programme in 2000. But unlike more conventional
forms of participatory governance that target the
working class and urban poor, Bhagidari was
restricted to the middle-class parts of the city.
Neighbourhood associations called Resident Welfare
Associations (RWAs) represented citizens. Evaluations
of the programme point towards improved urban
services in neighbourhoods where Bhagidari was
implemented. Based on the perceived success of
Bhagidari, similar programmes have been initiated in
other parts of the country. However, most studies so
far have focused on the impact of the programme
on urban services; the political impacts of the
programme remain largely unexplored.
This article explores the ways in which the Bhagidari
programme has influenced forms of demand making
for the poor. Three factors seem to have shaped the
impact of Bhagidari on the urban poor: a change in
the relationship between RWAs and local political
representatives due to the combination of Bhagidari
and fiscal decentralisation; the emergence of a class
identity of RWAs and their increasing influence on
public policy; and the changing nature of RWAs and
the government of Delhi within the larger political
context. While I recognise that it may be too early to
gauge the extent of these developments, it seems
important to examine the potential impact of the
incremental institutionalisation of citizen
participation on existing channels of political
representation for the poor.
The arguments presented here are based on 3.5
months of field research in Delhi, spread over the
summer of 2006 and December 2006–January
2007.1 Section 2 places the Bhagidari programme in
the context of attempts to decentralise urban
governance in India. In Section 3 the basic features of
the Bhagidari programme, the political logic for its
introduction and neighbourhood associations’ rise to
power are outlined. Section 4 highlights the ways in
which Bhagidari and middle-class activism impacted
directly on the poor and their traditional channels of
representation. Tentative conclusions are presented in
Section 5.
2 Participatory governance in India
The Indian state sought to localise democracy
through decentralisation in the early 1990s. The 73rd
and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts aimed to
create local self-government in rural and urban
areas, laying a framework to incorporate changes in
the organisation, functions, and jurisdiction of local
bodies. Success in implementing the acts however,
varied between states and urban and rural areas.
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Ramanathan (2007) argues that the government
largely ignored decentralisation in urban India instead
focusing on panchayati raj institutions in rural areas. It
was anticipated that creation of ‘Ward Committees’,
comprising local political representatives and
residents of one or more municipal wards, would
allow for direct citizen participation in cities. In all
but two states – West Bengal and Kerala, both of
which have been run by strong communist
governments for many years – decentralisation and
particularly creation of ward committees has been
difficult in urban India. The act’s ambiguity over Ward
Committees’ constituency size and procedures for
selecting members resulted in the creation of
defunct ward committees in most cities (Kundu
2006).2 The ratio between citizens and their elected
representatives for example is almost ten times
higher in urban areas (Ramanathan 2007). There may
be two possible reasons behind this variation: the
concentration of different hierarchies of political
representatives in urban areas allows very little
political space for yet another level of government
that could involve citizens; and the decentralisation
policies in India were initiated by the federal
government and were not a result of demands for
greater autonomy by the state or local governments.
For example, Harriss (2006: 9) emphasises that ‘for
most public administrators in India, the movement
towards decentralisation seemed a grim necessity or
a historical trend, rather than a positive good’.
In the capital city of New Delhi, the implementation
of the act was especially problematic under the
strong presence of federal government institutions,
the State Assembly and the municipal government.
The Ward Committees had as many as 1.25 million
citizens per committee, which impeded proximity
and accountability between the people and their
elected representatives (Kundu 2006). During the
same period, large cities in India saw a rise in
neighbourhood associations, which some argue was
an outcome of rapid growth generated after
economic reforms in the early 1990s (Fernandes
2006; Chatterjee 2004). Movements by
neighbourhood associations include the Porto
Alegre-inspired experiment called Janagraha in
Bangalore, the Advanced Locality Management
programme in Mumbai, and RWAs in Chennai, Delhi
and other cities. The Bhagidari programme sought to
institutionalise citizen participation in governance by
involving neighbourhood associations in local level
decision-making but managed to do this without
making any formal changes within the political
structure, something the federal act was unable to
achieve. The programme is largely seen as successful,
as reflected by the number of national and
international awards that it has received, including
the UN Public Service Award in 2005. This
perception of success has influenced governance
policies both at state and national levels in India and
led to the launching of similar programmes.
3 Bhagidari and the rise of the RWAs
The aim of Bhagidari (meaning ‘collaborative
partnership’ in Hindi) was to provide a collective
forum for government agencies and citizen groups
to solve problems and manage public assets. It was
expected that this exercise would empower citizens
and develop their sense of ownership over
government programmes (GNCTD 2006).
Government agencies that participated in the
programme included the government of Delhi and
its departments, local municipalities (Municipal
Corporation of Delhi and New Delhi Municipal
Council), Delhi Development Authority, and utility
agencies and companies (Delhi Jal Board and private
power distribution companies). Citizen groups
included RWAs, market and trader associations,
industrial associations, village groups and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). RWAs continue
to be the main focus of the programme, its
membership to Bhagidari growing from 20 in 2000
to more than 1900 in early 2007 (Joshi 2007). The
Asian Center for Organisation Research and
Development (ACORD), a private consulting firm
that had previously been engaged in change
management in large organisations like trade unions,
implemented Bhagidari. ACORD organised
workshops and meetings with government agencies
and RWAs from 2000 to 2004.
The Delhi government has often been credited for
progressive public policies, such as the conversion of
all public transport to Compressed Natural Gas in
2002. It is not surprising that the Delhi government
was the first to adopt participatory governance in
India (Dikshit 2007). However, the specific reasons for
the introduction of Bhagidari are important, including
the support from both senior political leaders and
bureaucrats. Bureaucrats supported the programme
because Bhagidari is the brainchild of a senior civil
servant in the Delhi administration. He conceptualised
the programme based on the wider goals of
participatory governance listed in the Congress Party
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manifesto and his team designed specific mechanisms
for implementation (Regunathan 2007). But many
programmes recommended by policy analysts cannot
find political support. The reason why the Chief
Minister not only adopted Bhagidari but also made it
the centerpiece of her government can be explained
by Delhi’s unique institutional environment. In a city
dominated by federal institutions, a high-profile and
people-friendly programme like Bhagidari was the
most visible means for the Chief Minister to publicise
the achievements her government and exert
authority. The large ongoing publicity campaign for
the programme includes advertisements and notices
in newspapers, billboards, public reports and even
business cards of government officials that bear the
Bhagidari logo alongside the ‘Delhi government’
insignia. Such publicity is significant as Bhagidari was
implemented when the major opposition party,
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was in power at the
Centre. Most of the activities of the Delhi
government are now conducted under the rubric of
Bhagidari.
The evolution of Bhagidari is paralleled with the
changing role of RWAs in the city. During the initial
years of the programme, the focus of Bhagidari was
principally on RWAs. Bhagidari was heralded as one
of the key achievements of the Delhi government
(The Hindu 7 Oct/10 Oct/3 Dec 2003). Political
observers even speculated that it would help the
Congress Party-led government attract middle-class
voters who traditionally supported the BJP (The
Hindu 17 Mar/14 Nov/30 Nov 2003). The Congress
Party did win the 2004 assembly elections and
Bhagidari is credited as an important factor in the
victory. But the rise of the RWAs ability to dominate
public policy discourse began only after 2004 during
the Congress Party’s second term in office. RWAs
arose after an important change in mode of delivery
of public services – the privatisation of the state-
owned electricity utility agency and consequent
increase in user charges. RWAs from across the city
formed horizontal networks to protest against the
policy. These protests drew support from prominent
citizens and celebrities who further attracted media
attention. The role of the media was crucial in
creating support for the protest and as a medium to
bargain with government agencies. Under enormous
public pressure, the government of Delhi was forced
to revert to the old electricity rates. RWAs soon
engaged in similar protests – against a proposal to
privatise the water utility agency and another Master
Plan3 guideline to regularise illegal commercial
establishments in the city. RWAs came to be
identified as the key ‘voice’ of the citizen and their
voice was often defined by their critical opinion of
Delhi government policies, including the Bhagidari
programme (The Hindu 31 Jul 2005). During the
same period, Bhagidari drew criticism from within
the state and central governments for failing to
include large segments of the population, such as
slum-dwellers and the poor (The Hindu 10 March
2006). Friction between RWAs and the Delhi
government ‘outside’ the Bhagidari programme
caused the Delhi government to shy away from
RWAs, which resulted in a further decline of
Bhagidari-related events like workshops and
meetings (The Hindu 14 Dec 2005).
Meanwhile, mobilisation by RWAs following the
protests led to the emergence of two large RWA
umbrella organisations – the Delhi RWAs Joint
Front (or Joint Front) and People’s Action. The Joint
Front primarily comprised of RWAs in the more
affluent parts of South Delhi. Although they were
highly critical of certain government policies, they
saw themselves as one of the ‘partners’ in public
decision making (Aggarwal 2007). The leaders in the
Joint Front had been instrumental in shaping the
implementation of the Bhagidari programme in its
initial years. In contrast, People’s Action had twice as
many RWA members that spanned middle-class
parts of the city. Their ideologies, however, vastly
differed. Unlike Joint Front, People’s Action argued
that negotiations with the government was a means
of co-option and refused to pay the increase in user
charges until the Delhi government responded (Kaul
2006). Their means of protests were reminiscent of
an opposition party. For example, they protested
under the banner of ‘Campaign Against Power Tariff
Hike’ and drew analogies with the ideas of civil
disobedience/satyagraha and non-cooperation used
during the non-violent freedom struggle against the
British (The Hindu 3 Oct 2005, 7 May 2006). Backed
by these ideologies, People’s Action mobilised RWAs
to contest the Municipal Elections in early 2007, a
first for a large Indian city. This is interesting because
middle-class associations, although culturally active,
have traditionally been characterised by their distance
from formal electoral politics.
4 Bhagidari’s impact on the urban poor
A distinguishing feature of Bhagidari was that it was
restricted to RWAs in the planned4 parts of the city.
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Although government officials recognise the
limitations of this approach, the rationale behind the
implementation process is based on two important
concepts: scale and legality. Bhagidari was started as
an experiment. RWAs were used as an entry point
because it allowed the government to build on
neighbourhood institutions that already existed at
the lowest level. Although Bhagidari put RWAs in
the spotlight, much of the growth of these
associations took place in the mid-1980s as security
concerns heightened in the capital following Indira
Gandhi’s assassination.5 RWAs are essentially
neighbourhood management committees in
apartment blocks or housing colonies to which the
residents pay regular charges and in return oversee
security and maintain common resources (Harriss
2005b). Government officials emphasised that it
would have been difficult to organise deliberative
meetings in slum settlements in the absence of
formal representative associations like RWAs.
Officials also expected that working with RWAs
would be a learning experience for the government
that would later help the programme expand to
other areas in the city (Wadhera 2007, Koreth 2007,
Regunathan 2007, Yadav 2006). Furthermore,
development in unauthorised areas ‘inevitably brings
up issues about land tenure’, which make it difficult
to implement such programmes (Yadav 2006). So
although government agencies continue to provide
basic amenities such as water, street lighting and
pavements in slums, they want to avoid negotiations
that may result in the provision of land titles. The
government’s rationale is well summarised by
Chatterjee (2004: 136): ‘if squatters were to be given
any kind of legitimacy by government authorities in
their illegal occupation of public or private lands,
then the entire structure of legally held property
would be threatened’.
This distinction between ‘planned’ and ‘informal’ is
key to understanding the variation in state–society
relationship across different fragments of the Indian
city. Chatterjee (2004: 35–7) draws a distinction
between ‘political society’ and ‘civil society’. Civil
society, he argues, is founded on ‘popular sovereignty
and grants equal rights to citizens’ (as taxpayers).
Political society is the ‘line connecting populations to
governmental agencies pursuing multiple policies of
security and welfare’ (as voters). He argues that
‘politics is often the only resource in a system which
many deny the benefits of policy decisions or legal
remedies to the poor’. Voting patterns for local
municipal elections in Delhi support his argument,
indicating that poor residents see political
representatives as the main channel for making their
voices heard (Baud et al. 2006). Similarly, Harriss
(2005a) observes in his study of civic associations in
Delhi that the urban poor most commonly solve
problems through political party mediation while the
middle class is more active in associational life like
RWAs. Further, slum-dwellers often access their
political representatives through local headmen called
‘pradhans’. The title ‘pradhan’ is one that recognises
someone who has some clout in a locality and who is
able to exercise some influence (Harriss 2005a).
Edelman and Mitra (2006: 26) describe the process of
bargaining between slum-dwellers and politicians as a
client–patron relationship where tenure and basic
amenities are exchanged for votes ‘with the
expectation of receiving large scale support at
election time’. The pradhan is the person who gathers
support for politicians by boosting attendance at
rallies and assuring votes. While pradhans are
accessible to all slum-dwellers, government officials
are mostly accessed by the wealthy and the well
connected (Rao et al. 2007). The key distinction
between the urban poor and the middle class’ access
to the state is that the middle class uses bureaucratic
and judicial channels as opposed to formal electoral
politics (Harriss 2005a). This is partly because the
middle class has better knowledge of the law and
access to resources, but also because middle-class
housing and occupations are more often ‘formal’ and
‘legal’ and become the basis for representation when
outnumbered by the more politically active poor. This
is reflected in voter turnout rates in the order of
35–40 per cent in middle-class areas as opposed to
more than 80 per cent in poorer neighbourhoods
and slums (Mazzarella 2006).
Middle-class residents are distant from formal
electoral politics and local political representatives.
In many neighbourhoods, especially in higher
income areas, residents do not even know their
local municipal councillor. When residents did
approach politicians, residents were often frustrated
with the clientelistic nature of politics that favours
particular population groups in the ward.6
Importantly, Bhagidari brought RWA members from
middle-class neighbourhoods and local political
representatives to the same forum. Bhagidari
workshops and meetings organised by the
government of Delhi, particularly in the initial years
of the programme, facilitated this process. The
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purpose of these workshops was to initiate dialogue
and joint problem solving among key stakeholders –
RWAs and officials from government agencies and
political representatives (GNCTD 2006). The
institution of administrative mechanisms for better
communication between RWAs and government
agencies resulted from the workshops. ‘Bhagidari
Cells’ and ‘Nodal Officers’ in each participating
agency allowed RWAs access to the top tiers in
these agencies directly. Since Bhagidari had the
patronage of the Chief Minister, she took personal
interest in the working of the ‘Cells’. While these
mechanisms were helpful to an extent in improving
government agency responsiveness, they also
resulted in a parallel system of governance that
bypassed local political representatives, antagonising
the relationship between RWAs and local politicians.
The Bhagidari programme and the developments
surrounding the programme have influenced the
relationship between government agencies, political
representatives and citizen groups from the
neighbourhood level to the level of the state.
Although Bhagidari primarily targeted the middle
class, the implications of the programme have
extended to the urban poor. These implications, I
suggest, have been shaped by three major factors:
(1) a change in the relationship between RWAs and
local political representatives (directly as a result of
Bhagidari) and fiscal decentralisation in the municipal
agency; (2) the class identity of RWA umbrella
organisations and their ability to influence
government decision making; and (3) the changing
relationship between RWAs and the government of
Delhi within the larger political context.
4.1 Bhagidari and traditional forms of demand
making
As described earlier, Bhagidari provided a formal
platform for RWAs and local political representatives
to interact, in some instances for the first time. The
system created a parallel governance track that
undermined local politicians, resulting in tension
between the two groups. During the same period,
the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) had been
pushing for greater decentralisation in its own
administration. The councillors and Members of
Legislative Assembly (MLAs) have traditionally been
provided with constituency funds to spend for
development-related work in their respective wards.
The amount for this fund gradually tripled from
£42,500.00 (Rs.35 lakhs) in 2002 to about
£122,500.00 (Rs.1 crore) in 2006. Municipal
councillors and MLAs thus acquired greater executive
powers within their jurisdictions. Their funds, that
were originally only large enough for minor
maintenance works, could now be used for more
significant development. As a consequence of these
two forms of decentralisation (Bhagidari and fiscal
devolution), RWAs demanded more of local political
representatives. In mega-cities like Delhi, where
millions of dollars are pumped into large
infrastructure projects, especially in recent years, the
councillor’s fund increasingly constitutes a minuscule
proportion of the city’s budget. But this could have a
significant impact on service delivery for the urban
poor because political representatives are the
primary means through which the urban poor access
the state. In the two wards studied, public spending
for low-income neighbourhoods has remained more
or less the same during 2002–7, but it has increased
substantially for middle-class neighbourhoods,
suggesting that the benefits of decentralisation
disproportionately favour the middle class. For
example, the expenditure on middle-class
neighbourhoods in the South Delhi and North Delhi
ward has increased by 27 per cent and 25 per cent
respectively in a matter of only five years.7
Second, the recent dominance of RWA umbrella
organisations has, to an extent, empowered RWAs
at the neighbourhood level. People’s Action
mobilised RWAs to contest local municipal elections
under the rationale that ‘it was up to the middle
class to clean up the dirty (vote-bank8) politics in the
country that has marginalised the middle class’ (Kaul
2006). RWAs contesting the elections belonged to a
middle-class neighborhood with higher
concentrations of professional and salaried class
people, most of which had an antagonistic
relationship with their local councillor following the
Bhagidari programme. Although none of the RWA
candidates won the 2007 MCD elections,9 they did
better than other independent candidates (The Hindu
9 April 2007). In addition, middle-class electoral
participation in RWA-contested wards was higher
than in comparable wards and previous years (The
Hindu 20 April 2007). Since the primary reason
behind the RWA’s move toward formal politics is to
safeguard middle-class interests and since formal
electoral politics is the main channel through which
the urban poor influences public policy, this
development may crowd out poor voters and have
adverse implications on service delivery for the poor.
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4.2 Middle-class identity and the urban poor
A change in public services triggered RWA
mobilisation and class identity further contributed
towards collective action. RWAs that led the protest
were not only middle class in nature but also formed
part of the salaried professional class. The issues they
raised reflected and supported their middle-class
identity and countered other social groups. This is
exemplified by RWA umbrella organisation protests
against affirmative action for backwards classes10 in
higher learning institutes. Similarly, during the power
hike case, the rationale for protest was not just the
increase in user charges, but also the argument that
the ‘middle class should not be made to pay for
others who form the “vote-bank” of political
leaders’, referring to electricity theft in informal
settlements (The Hindu 18 Dec 2005). Joint Front
and People’s Action protested against regularisation
of illegal commercial establishments in the city, many
of which were owned by lower income populations
(The Hindu 23 Oct 2006). RWAs from lower middle-
class neighbourhoods criticised the Joint Front for
being elitist and unaware of the ‘ground realities and
the unemployment prevailing in the Capital’ (The
Hindu 3 May, 28 March 2006). While political leaders
regularised illegal shops on the grounds of securing
the livelihoods of thousands of people, RWAs
petitioned the courts against this policy on the
rationale of ‘planning, public interest and citizen’s
rights’ (Civil Society 2006). About 90 per cent of the
Public Interest Litigations filed by RWAs since 2000
(until May 2007) are regarding encroachments on
public land and unauthorised construction (Office of
the Registrar General, Delhi High Court 2007).
Significantly, RWAs now strongly influence public
policymaking and some of their self-interested
demands are directed against the poor. Their access
to the law and use of legal channels against informal
settlements and occupations negatively impacts
the poor.
At another level, the recent body of literature on the
rise of middle class in India describes neighbourhood
associations as hegemonic institutions that seek to
re-define the use of public spaces by dislocating the
urban poor from their visual proximity (Fernandes
2006; Chatterjee 2004). This mobilisation is
explained as a sociological phenomenon as the
middle class begins to mimic the lifestyle of the
‘global city’ and displaces subaltern11 groups in the
process. While this theory might only hold true for
certain elite neighbourhoods in the city, many
middle-class neighbourhoods are increasingly
becoming more exclusionary through the
construction of boundary walls and gates. Many
stand-alone developments by RWAs support this
argument. For example, the Sundar Nagar RWA
restricted vendors from entering their colony.
Following a Public Interest Litigation by RWAs, the
court directed the MCD to remove all slum clusters
from the neighbourhood (Kundu 2006). Members of
RWAs often equated slum settlements within and
around their neighbourhoods with criminals (because
they occupy land illegally) and stated that the
removal of ‘encroachments’ was one of their
association’s objectives.
4.3 Reaction to anti-Bhagidari
As noted earlier, Bhagidari drew criticism from
RWAs and within the government. The increasingly
difficult relationship between RWAs and the Delhi
government outside Bhagidari led the government
to shy away from RWAs. Bhagidari was not
discontinued since it was the most visible
programme of the Delhi government, but the focus
shifted to other sectors like education and health and
most recently, to extending the programme to
informal settlements. It will be interesting to watch
this shift to informal settlements since the original
reasons for not extending the programme to these
settlements are still valid. The administration may be
willing to extend the programme to informal areas
because government officials’ experience with the
RWAs has prepared them for the more challenging
task of working with associations of slum-dwellers.
Also, this extension to informal settlements is timed
immediately before the Assembly Elections in 2008
and slum-dwellers constitute the traditional support
for the Congress Party in Delhi, the party currently in
power. In fact, the Bhagidari programme was initially
publicised in a large way only months before the last
Assembly Elections in 2004. The focus is expected to
be on education, vocational training and health.
Spatially, the programme would focus on low-
income settlements where land titles are not
disputed. The programme is currently in the planning
stage but evaluation studies point towards
improvement in services in neighbourhoods where
Bhagidari was implemented.
5 Conclusions
Clearly, it is too early to judge whether Bhagidari is
good or bad for the urban poor or even speculate on
how significant the impacts on the poor may be in the
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future. The programme has strengthened the role of
middle-class neighbourhood associations. These
associations act in self-interest but in the process,
their activities are often directed against the urban
poor. The implications of Bhagidari and neighbourhood
associations on the poor have been shaped by three
factors: (1) a change in the relationship between RWAs
and local political representatives combined with fiscal
decentralisation; (2) the emergence of a class identity
of RWA umbrella organisations and their ability to
influence government decision making; and (3) the
changing relationship between RWAs and the
government of Delhi within the larger political
context. Formal politics, law and media are the
primary instruments that middle-class associations use
to influence public policy.
Fiscal devolution within the local government and
greater interaction between political representatives
and RWAs as a result of Bhagidari has led RWAs to
exert greater demands on local politicians. This has
translated into an increase in public expenditure in
middle-class neighbourhoods since the
implementation of the programme. The
administrative mechanisms instituted by Bhagidari
further led to an antagonistic relationship between
RWAs and local political representatives. As a
consequence, some RWAs entered formal politics
primarily on the grounds of ‘safeguarding middle-
class interests’. Both these developments could have
significant impacts on the urban poor since the poor
continue to use formal politics as the primary
channel of accessing the state.
Activism by the middle class is defined by its class
interest, which also has direct and indirect
implications of the poor. Protests against affirmative
action, increases in electricity rates (which RWAs
argued was because of power theft by informal
settlements) and the Master Plan guideline to
regularise illegal commercial establishments (most of
which are operated by low-income residents) are
some examples. The role of the media, which the
middle class dominates, is central to giving the
protests a city (and even national) level presence thus
adding to its political significance. Since middle-class
occupations and housing are more often built on
structures of legality, law becomes an important
mechanism for the middle class to exert dominance
over other social groups. This is exemplified by the
use of Public Interest Litigations against informal
settlements, both by individual RWAs in their
neighbourhoods and RWA umbrella organisations
against the Master Plan.
However, the larger democratic systems within
which these institutions are embedded provide some
leeway for the poor. Bhagidari drew criticism from
within the government for failing to reach the
majority of the city’s population – the poor. The
increasingly difficult relationship between RWAs and
the Delhi government outside the programme led
the government to shift its focus away from RWAs.
Extension of Bhagidari to the informal settlements is
a reflection of this shift. Although the success of the
Bhagidari in informal settlements would depend on
how the programme was implemented, the
programme would bring the highest tiers in
government closer to urban poor and would
hopefully increase service delivery to those excluded
from the current system.
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1 I mostly rely on qualitative research methods: both
interviews and ethnographic tools. I conducted
more than 50 interviews with current and retired
government officials, political representatives,
members of RWAs and heads of umbrella
associations of RWAs, leaders and residents of
slums and informal settlements, academics and
independent researchers and NGOs. Interviews
with RWA members were concentrated in two
municipal wards in North and South Delhi,
respectively with the intention of choosing a
sample representative of different socioeconomic
backgrounds. I used government reports,
documents, budgets and circulars provided by a
host of local government departments to study
the interaction of RWAs with these agencies. I
relied heavily on newspaper and magazine articles
to corroborate findings from interviews and fill in
data gaps missed during fieldwork. In addition, I
was on the email lists for two of the RWA
umbrella organisations, which I used to trace the
activities of the organisations. Finally, I have used
published and unpublished articles, theses and
books for literature review.
2 According to the Constitution of India, urban
development is under the discretion of state
governments. The implementation of the act,
including constitution of ward committees, differs
across states.
3 The Master Plan is a statutory planning document
that outlines the broad policies for the long-term
(usually 10–20 years) development for the city.
4 Planned refers to either plotted (single family
homes) or apartment-style housing developed
through formal regulations/zoning guidelines.
‘Unauthorised’ or ‘unplanned’ development refers
to housing privately developed without following
the zoning regulations laid down by the Master Plan.
5 Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh
bodyguards in October 1984. After her death,
anti-Sikh pogroms engulfed Delhi and other cities
in northern India, resulting in over 2,700 deaths,
mostly innocent Sikhs.
6 For example, many RWA members who I
interviewed in North Delhi accused the councillor
of nepotism and favouring the trader (Baniya)
community to which he belonged. In South Delhi,
RWA members blamed the councillor for
supporting illegal encroachments in the
neighbourhood since the poor formed the local
politician’s ‘vote-bank’.
7 This finding is based on analysis of ward-level
municipal budgets from 2002–3 to 2006–7
onwards in two wards where I conducted
fieldwork. I classify expenditure in different areas
in the ward as ‘middle-class’ and ‘low-income’
neighbourhoods based on my knowledge of the
wards.
8 Vote-bank politics is the practice of creating and
maintaining vote-banks (a loyal bloc of voters
from a single community, who consistently back a
certain candidate or political formation in
democratic elections) through divisive policies. As
this brand of politics encourages voters to vote on
the basis of narrow communal considerations,
often against their better judgement, it is
considered inimical to democracy.
9 Although RWAs contesting local elections was a
new development in Delhi, the outcome of the
election was largely decided by the issue of
sealing commercial establishments. The protests
and violence that followed the sealing worked
against the Congress Party government. The anti-
incumbency vote went in favour of the major
opposition party, the BJP.
10 Socially and economically backward classes that
include Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
other Backward Castes are provided reservation
in the public sector institutions as a means of
affirmative action by the Constitution of India.
11 Subaltern refers to e-marginalised groups and
lower classes in post-colonial literature.
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